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57 
RESCUING THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS METAPHOR IN 
PROPERTY LAW 
Jane B. Baron∗ 
For much of the twentieth century, legal academics conceptualized 
property as a bundle of rights.  But property theory today is deeply 
divided between theorists who focus on property’s ends, i.e., its 
reflection of values such as democracy or human flourishing, and those 
who focus on property’s means, i.e., its use of qualities such as 
modularity and exclusion to manage complexity in a cost-effective way.  
The bundle-of-rights conceptualization has been swept up into the 
controversy, becoming the particular target of means-focused theorists, 
who argue that the bundle conceptualization obscures critical features 
of the property system, most notably its use of strategies of exclusion, in 
rem rights, and indirectness.  These theorists assert that, twentieth 
century wisdom notwithstanding, property is not a bundle of rights but 
rather is a law of things. 
 
Contrary to these theorists, this Article argues that the bundle-of-rights 
conceptualization remains useful both descriptively and normatively.  
First, the bundle-of-rights conceptualization produces more precise 
specification of the legal relations of parties in both simple and complex 
property arrangements.  Second, it clarifies the normative choices that 
underlie decisions about property.  Third, it focuses attention on the 
quality of the relationships that property constructs.  Finally, bundle-of-
rights analysis generally forces information forward.  Because the 
information produced by the granular analysis of property bundles is 
useful, the bundle-of-rights metaphor should not be displaced or 
abandoned.  Indeed, the complexity of contemporary property issues—
and in particular their growing connection to the alternative legal fields 
of privacy and intellectual property—makes the bundle-of-rights 
conceptualization all the more fruitful. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For much of the twentieth century, legal academics conceptualized 
property as a bundle of rights.1  The bundle-of-rights metaphor captures 
well the way in which ownership interests can be divided over time, as 
in the case of present and future interests, and among different people, 
as in the case of concurrent interests (e.g., joint tenancies) and common 
interest communities (e.g., condominiums).  The bundle-of-rights view 
also counterbalances an older absolutist picture derived from 
Blackstone’s description of property as “despotic dominion” exercised 
by “one man” over “external things.”2  The Blackstonian view posits 
nearly limitless rights consolidated in a single owner, who can exclude 
all others.  In contrast, the bundle-of-rights metaphor emphasizes that 
property is not “sole dominion,” but involves, in many cases, only 
relatively better rights.  The bundle metaphor also highlights that 
property involves not just “one man” and his “external things,” but 
multiple parties tied together in relationships that are social as well as 
legal.3  Seen as a bundle of rights, property is not monolithic but is 
composed of pieces (sometimes called “sticks”) that are combined 
 
 1. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 319 (1997) (“No expression 
better captures the modern legal understanding of ownership than the metaphor of property as a ‘bundle 
of rights.’”); J. E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 
(1966) (“The currently prevailing understanding of property in what might be called mainstream Anglo-
American legal philosophy is that property is best understood as a ‘bundle of rights.’”).  
 2. The full quote describes property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual 
in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2.  Scholars 
have questioned whether Blackstone himself held the absolutist views attributed to him.  Carol M. Rose, 
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); David B. Schorr, How 
Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103 (2009). 
 3. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 319 (“the metaphor of property as a ‘bundle of 
rights’ . . . was intended to signify three insights.  First, it indicates that ownership is a complex legal 
relationship.  Second, the metaphor illuminates the fact that the constitutive elements of that relationship 
are legal rights.  Third, and most important, it underscores the social character of that relationship.”). 
2
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together but can be disentangled.  Property is not about the connection 
between people and things, but about the connections between and 
among people.   
Today, however, property theory is deeply divided, and the bundle-
of-rights conceptualization has been swept up into the controversy.4  
One influential strand of contemporary theory focuses on the mechanics 
of how property operates, its use of qualities such as “modularity,”5 or 
“boundaries,”6 or “residual managerial authority”7 to solve problems of 
social organization and information economy.  These means-focused 
theories square off against theories that focus more on the outcomes or 
ends the property system produces, asking whether these outcomes 
reflect values such as democracy,8 freedom,9 or human flourishing.10   
While ends theorists have sometimes questioned the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor,11 it has become a particular target for means theorists, who 
argue that the bundle conceptualization obscures critical features of the 
property system, such as its use of strategies of exclusion, in rem rights, 
and indirectness.12  Means theorists have argued that the bundle-of-
 
 4. Lee Ann Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2013) 
(“Property theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement design: whether property 
rules or liability rules should dominate, whether an exclusion—or thing—based vision of property 
should trump the bundle of rights metaphor, whether fixed menus of tenure forms aid or impede 
efficiency, and so on.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2083 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Institutions]; Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in 
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2098 (2012). 
 6. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1703 (2012) 
[hereinafter Smith, Things].  
 7. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061 (2012).  Merrill pairs 
residual managerial authority with “residual accessionary rights.” Id. at 2067. 
 8. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). 
 9. Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New 
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005). 
 10. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 745 (2009). 
 11. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 207 
(2000) (arguing that the bundle-of-rights approach does not displace the “ownership model” in which 
owners are understood to have nearly unlimited powers and state regulation is seen as antithetical to 
freedom); Alexander, supra note 10, at 801 (suggesting that, at least in the context of takings, the 
metaphor ought to be abandoned). 
 12. These features are explored infra text accompanying notes 61–66, 76–81, 131–139, 213–219. 
Not all scholars who oppose the bundle of rights conceptualization of property do so entirely or even 
primarily on means grounds.  For example, one of the most influential critics of the bundle-of-rights 
picture, J.E. Penner, presents “conceptual” objections to the bundle metaphor.  See Penner, supra note 1, 
at 767–99.  Other critics of the bundle of rights model argue that bundle analysis does not lead to results 
all that different from alternative conceptions. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A 
Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 243 (1994); Adam 
Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8(3) ECON JOURNAL WATCH 255, 256 (2011). 
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rights conception metaphor fails to be a theory of property,13  fails to 
answer difficult property questions,14 and fails to apprehend that 
“property is a holistic system made up of interactive components, not a 
system in which anything can in principle relate to anything else.”15  
They assert that, twentieth century wisdom notwithstanding, property “is 
not a bundle of rights”16 but rather a “law of things.”17 
Contrary to the means theorists’ critique, this Article argues that the 
bundle-of-rights conceptualization remains useful both descriptively and 
normatively.  Bundle-of-rights analysis helps to specify the legal 
relations of parties in both simple and complex property arrangements, 
to identify explicitly the normative choices implicit in those 
arrangements, to assess the quality of the human relationships that 
property entails, and to force the production of information pertinent to 
those issues.  Because the information produced by the granular analysis 
of property bundles is useful, the bundle-of-rights metaphor should not 
be displaced or abandoned.  Indeed, the complexity of contemporary 
property issues—in particular, their growing connection to the 
alternative legal fields of “privacy” and “intellectual property”—makes 
the bundle conceptualization all the more fruitful. 
As Part II explains, critiques of the bundle-of-rights conceptualization 
begin with an intellectual history of how the metaphor came to 
dominance.  From this historical narrative, means-focused property 
theorists have distilled three stories of dystopian dysfunction.  The first 
is a tale of ad hocery, in which the bundles are assembled and 
disassembled without regard to social costs or potential anticommons 
 
  But while not all antibundle scholars focus as intently on means as Henry Smith, who is 
probably the most passionate contemporary detractor of the bundle metaphor, many of these other 
scholars share to some significant degree Smith’s commitments to the primacy of exclusion, things, and 
in rem rights in property.  Many also share Smith’s view that property is not primarily about ends.  See, 
e.g., Larissa Katz, The Regulative Function of Property Rights, 8(3) ECON JOURNAL WATCH 236, 240–
41 (2011) (distinguishing between, on the one hand, “bundle-of-rights approaches,” which focus on “the 
substantive outcomes that owners should produce,” and, on the other hand, a view of private property 
“as a strategy for managing resources” that provides “an alternative to collective deliberation about how 
a thing ought to be used”). 
  Those whom I characterize as ends theorists are not entirely indifferent to means questions, 
and as I explain, infra notes 59–69 and accompanying text, those whom I characterize as means theorists 
are not entirely indifferent to ends.  Thus, the distinction between ends and means theorists should not 
be overdrawn.  I use “ends theorists” and “means theorists” as terminological shorthands, not to flatten 
divergences among theorists’ views, nor to perpetuate a caricatured distinction. 
 13. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1700. 
 14. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8(3) ECON JOURNAL WATCH 247 (2011) 
[hereinafter Merrill, Prism] (“the bundle metaphor . . . has been more successful in framing questions 
that in answering them”). 
 15. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1700. 
 16. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law 
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 17. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1691. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/2
2013] RESCUING THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS METAPHOR 61 
problems.  The second is a story of elitism, in which academics 
disdainfully mock lay understandings of property.  The third is a story of 
politicization, in which Legal Realists and their descendants seek to 
highjack property for purposes of an overtly regulatory agenda.  The 
stories of ad hocery, elitism, and political extremism are caricatures that 
could be constructed quite differently.  Contrary to the stories’ claims, 
we have nothing to fear from the bundle-of-rights conceptualization.  
Part III makes the affirmative case for the bundle-of-rights view of 
property.  First, the bundle-of-rights conceptualization produces more 
precise specification of the legal relations of parties, especially in the 
case of intangible property.  Second, it clarifies the normative choices 
that underlie decisions about property.  Third, it focuses attention on the 
quality of the relationships property constructs.  Finally, bundle-of-
rights analysis generally forces information forward.  While the bundle-
of-rights view cannot and will not determine what kind of property 
system we should have, it can force us to be more transparent about the 
choices we make in our decisions about property.  If, as means-focused 
theories suggest, property’s architecture produces normatively good 
results in the ordinary run of cases, then the granular analysis produced 
by the bundle-of-rights conceptualization will confirm that fact.  If 
property’s architecture is not producing such results, we are better off 
knowing. 
Part IV seeks to illustrate the bundle-of-rights metaphor’s potential 
through brief case studies of two contemporary information-based 
assets: electronic health records and commercial databases.  The 
property disputes of our future will involve just these sorts of assets, 
which lie in a kind of netherworld between property, privacy, and 
intellectual property.  Property rights in these assets—if indeed we 
decide to classify these assets as property at all—will look more like 
bundled rights than the modular packages that are paradigmatic of the 
law of things.  And constructing the bundle will require hard choices 
about who should be able to extract “value” from assets that require 
contributions from multiple participants.  The bundle-of-rights view of 
property will force us to make these choices explicitly and transparently.  
II. A HISTORY AND THREE STORIES 
Subpart A of this section describes, in broad strokes, a compressed 
intellectual history of the development of the bundle-of-rights metaphor 
and of the metaphor’s influence over time.  While different versions of 
this account vary in their particulars, there is remarkable agreement on 
the main points of this history across the spectrum of property 
scholarship.  The larger narrative of the rise of the bundle-of-rights 
5
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conceptualization contains the seeds of three stories about the bundle 
metaphor, stories that are particularly salient—and particularly 
troubling—for means-focused property scholars.  The first is that the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor permits the sticks of property rights to be 
combined ad hoc, in any old way, without regard to information costs or 
anticommons problems.  The second is that the bundle-of-rights 
conceptualization is elitist and at odds with lay understandings of 
property.  The third is that the bundle view provides the groundwork for 
increased state intervention in and regulation of property.  Subparts B 
through D describe these stories, in each case suggesting alternative 
ways in which the stories might be told. 
A. An Intellectual History of the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor 
Property scholars’ histories of the bundle-of-rights metaphor all begin 
with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld.18  Despite acknowledging that he did 
not originate the metaphor19 or even use the term “bundle of rights,”20 
property scholars assert that his unpacking of legal rights into 
component jural correlatives and opposites provided both the 
“intellectual justification”21 and the “analytic vocabulary”22 for the 
bundle-of-rights conception.23  Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis of rights 
in terms of jural relations led to the development of the notions that 
property consists not of things, but of legal relationships.  It similarly led 
to the rise of the view that those relationships are not relationships 
between persons and things, but instead relationships among persons.24  
These notions present a non-Blackstonian picture in which property is 
 
 18. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Fundamental Legal Conceptions I]; Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710 
(1917) [hereinafter Fundamental Legal Conceptions II]. 
 19. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 319–20 (Hohfeld did not introduce the bundle of rights concept 
into American legal discourse). 
 20. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191 (1999) 
(Hohfeld “never mentions a ‘bundle of rights’”). 
 21. Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001). 
 22. STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 18 (1990). 
 23. Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2001, 2007, 2010 (2009) (describing Hohfeld as the “progenitor” of the bundle metaphor); 
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (2003) (describing Hohfeld as 
“closely associated” with the bundle of rights concept). 
 24. Heller, supra note 20, at 1191–92; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the 
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Conception of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 
360 (1980); ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 321; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of 
Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 327 (2002).   
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no longer centered on things25 and is no longer seen to involve absolute 
dominion.26 
The next step in the history of the rise of the bundle conceptualization 
involves the Legal Realists.  Some scholars assert that the Realists 
“popularized” Hohfeld’s concept of the social conception of 
ownership,27 others assert that they “embraced” the bundle of rights 
metaphor,28 and still others assert that they “co-opted”29 or 
“appropriated”30 Hohfeld’s conceptual work.  Some theorists see the 
Realists’ warm reception of Hohfeld as a response to late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century changes in the kind of assets protected under the 
“property” rubric, as “de-physicalized” forms of wealth, such as 
business goodwill or intellectual property, challenged existing land-
based property categories.31   
Other scholars, in contrast, see the Realists’ embrace of Hohfeld as a 
strategic political move, in which the Realists “sought to undermine the 
notion that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for 
activist state intervention in regulating and redistributing property.”32  
The bundle-of-rights picture of property enables such a state because “if 
property has no fixed core of meaning, but is just a variable collection of 
interests established by social convention, then there is no good reason 
why the state should not freely expand or, better yet, contract the lists of 
interests in the name of the general welfare.”33 
This historical account largely elides jurisprudential disputes over 
what truly counts as legal realism34 or who really counts as a Legal 
Realist35—though most agree that Hohfeld was not one himself.36  The 
account also largely elides exactly how the Realists managed to imbue 
 
 25. Penner, supra note 1, at 731 (Hohfeld’s refusal to see property as a right to a thing provides 
the basis for the bundle of rights picture, following which “property is free to float free from any 
anchorage to the concept of a ‘right to a thing.’”). 
 26. Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 360–61. 
 27. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 319. 
 28. Merrill, Prism, supra note 14, at 248. 
 29. Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 
635 (2009). 
 30. Id. at 636. 
 31. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 145–65 
(1992); Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 328–30; Arnold, supra note 24, at 288. 
 32. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 365.  See also Mossoff, supra note 23, at 2007 (the bundle 
of rights reconceptualization of property was helpful to Progressives “because it made it possible for the 
modern administrative state to control and restrict various property uses without implicating the 
constitutional protections of the Takings or Due Process Clauses”). 
 33. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 365. 
 34. On this point, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731 
(2009); Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 949 (2013). 
 35. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 311–12; HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 169–70.   
 36. Claeys, supra note 29, at 635. 
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Hohfeld’s insights with the force they came to have.37  Certain Realist 
figures and articles do make repeated cameo appearances.  Morris 
Cohen’s Property and Sovereignty38 is high on the list because—
emphasizing the social nature of property rights—he claimed that “a 
property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but 
between the owner and other individuals in reference to things,”39 and 
that, because owners’ privileges, powers, and immunities correlate with 
nonowners’ duties, disabilities, and liabilities, “dominion over things is 
also imperium over our fellow man.”40  Robert Hale’s writings—
emphasizing owners’ powers to free nonowners from the duties, 
disabilities, and liabilities to which their nonownership subjects them by 
offering them disagreeable wage labor—also get occasional mention.41  
The definition of property in Restatement (First) of Property as “legal 
relations between persons with respect to a thing”42 is sometimes offered 
as conclusive evidence of the influence of the Realists’ interpretation of 
Hohfeld.43 
Three figures come next in property scholars’ intellectual history of 
the development of the bundle of rights.  The first is A.M. Honoré, 
whose influential essay, Ownership, further disaggregated property into 
eleven “incidents.”44  These incidents could then (and now) be 
 
 37. Merrill and Smith attribute the influence of the Realist conception to Coase, who popularized 
a “hyper-realist conception of property” that encouraged economists to adopt the view that “property 
consists of nothing more than the authoritative list of permitted uses of a resource—posted, as it were, 
by the state for each object of scarcity.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 366.  See also infra text 
accompanying note 51 (further discussing Coase).  Alexander traces the popularization of Hohfeld’s 
ideas among Legal Realists to Arthur Corbin and Walter Wheeler Cook.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, 
at 319–21. 
 38. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).  Cohen is also 
sometimes cited for having treated property as an example of transcendental nonsense in his 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
 39. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, supra note 38, at 12.  As developed infra note 194, Cohen 
also emphasized the importance of owners’ powers to exclude.  Adam Mossoff argues that this aspect of 
Realist writing has been largely unappreciated.  Mossoff, supra note 23, at 2011–12. 
 40. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, supra note 38, at 13. 
 41. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 
470 (1923), discussed in ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 335.  On Hale’s thoughts more generally, see 
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST 
LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, Introductory cmt. (1936), cited in Adam 
Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.  371, 395 n.93 (2003). 
 43. See Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH 279, 280 
(2011).  See also Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 361–62 (citing Restatement’s use of the Hohfeldian 
vocabulary).  To the same effect, bundle critics often cite a 1936 definition of property as just “a 
euphonious collocation of letters which serves as a general term for a miscellany of equities that persons 
hold in the commonwealth.”  Walter H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 528, 528 (1937), cited in Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at n.36.  
 44. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, FIRST SERIES 107–47 
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
8
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conceptualized as components—or “sticks”—in the property bundle.45  
Whether any of Honoré’s enumerated incidents was essential, was, and 
continues to be, debated—a debate that, in the eyes of some, only 
reinforces the idea that property is a bundle and that its composition is 
contingent.  The other major figure emerging at almost the same time is 
Felix Cohen, whose Dialogue on Private Property46 further entrenched 
the bundle-of-rights picture.  While Cohen attacked the extreme Realist 
position that property was a mere “euphonious collection of letters,”47 he 
nonetheless described as a “confusion” the idea of property “as a 
dyadic . . . relation between a person and a thing,”48 emphasizing that in 
many cases “there may be no thing in a property relationship” and that 
“property essentially involves relations between people.”49  Cohen 
further emphasized the role of government in “private” property.  In his 
famous summary of property as a missive to the world to “Keep off X 
unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold,” it was 
essential not just that the communication be signed by “Private Citizen” 
but that it be endorsed by “The State.”50  The final figure to reinforce the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor in almost hyper-realist terms is Ronald 
Coase, who (however improbably)51 inspired a generation of law and 
economics scholars to conceptualize property as just a “cluster of in 
personam rights,”52 nothing more than “the authoritative list of 
permitted use of a resource—posted, as it were, by the state for each 
object of scarcity.”53 
The scholarly history of the bundle-of-rights metaphor tends to end 
with Thomas Grey’s essay, The Disintegration of Property.54  Writing in 
1980, Grey canvassed the variety of ways in which the term “property” 
had come to be employed and found that “discourse about property has 
 
 45. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 663 (1998) (“Honoré’s list is now commonly accepted by property 
theorists as a starting point for describing the core bundle of private property rights . . . , although some 
theorists challenge the inclusion of one incident or another.”). 
 46. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954). 
 47. Id. at 359, 378. 
 48. Id. at 378. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 374. 
 51. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. S77, 83 (2011) (“Coase had little sympathy with the Legal Realist agenda of enhancing collective 
control or redistribution of property.”).  
 52. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360.  See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 80 
(“Coase presupposed a particular picture of property—that of property as a bundle of rights, or more 
precisely, as a collection of use rights authoritatively prescribed for each resource by the state.”). 
 53. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 366. 
 54. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY (J. Roland 
Pennock and John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
9
Baron: Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
66 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
fragmented into a set of discontinuous usages” that “depart drastically 
from one another and from common speech.”55  Property, Grey wrote, 
“is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual scheme.  
The concept of property and the institution of property have 
disintegrated.”56  Grey left no doubt of the cause of this phenomenon: 
“The substitution of a bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership conception 
of property has the ultimate consequence that property ceases to be an 
important category in legal and political thought.”57  Putting the point 
another way, property as a legal category died no natural death, but was 
effectively murdered by the bundle-of-rights conceptualization.58 
To summarize: property scholars’ history of the rise in influence of 
the bundle-of-rights metaphor begins with Hohfeld’s conceptualization 
of “jural relations” as connections between persons and other persons 
rather than between persons and things.  It then moves to the Legal 
Realists, who fitted this new conceptualization to emerging forms of 
intangible property, to the functioning of property as power (sometimes 
called “coercion”) in labor and other markets, and to their view of the 
state.  In the mid-1950s, Honoré’s enumeration of property’s incidents 
enhanced the seeming suitability of the bundle-of-rights metaphor, 
providing a list of potential sticks for the bundle, while Felix Cohen, as 
his father before him, continued to attack the logic of connecting 
property with things.  Coase gave these views further traction by 
predicating his analysis on a view of property rights as fundamentally in 
personam relationships.  By the end of the twentieth century, the bundle-
of-rights metaphor had robbed property of viability as an independent, 
meaningful legal category.   
To understand why this broad narrative is important to scholars 
conceptualizing property in terms of things, it is useful to summarize 
their larger project to theorize property in terms of means rather than 
ends.59  In the view of these theorists, property begins with a problem, 
complexity, and its rules are designed to “manage” that complexity in a 
cost-effective way.60  The precise mechanisms by which that complexity 
 
 55. Id. at 72. 
 56. Id. at 74. 
 57. Id. at 81. 
 58. On Grey as the endpoint, see Mossoff, supra note 42, at 373; Mossoff, supra note 23, at 
2010–11; Jonathan Remy Nash, Packaging Property: The Effect of Paradigmatic Framing of Property 
Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691, 694–707 (2009); Arnold, supra note 24, at 291. 
 59. See Katz, supra note 12, at 237 (while property theory cannot tell us what our substantive 
priorities should be, “it can tell us quite a lot about how a system of property rights can function as a 
strategy for regulating our conduct with respect to the things of the world”) (emphasis added). On 
divisions within means theory itself, see supra note 12. 
 60. See, e.g., Smith, Institutions, supra note 5, at 2096 (“Property law manages much complexity 
through modularity.”); Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1703 (property employs “limited interfaces to 
manage complexity”). 
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is managed—the employment of modularity,61 boundaries,62 and 
exclusion63—are of substantial interest.  This is so because the goal of 
these theories is to describe how property works at a structural, 
architectural level64 and to highlight the specific features of property, 
such as the employment of in rem rights,65 that make it different from 
other fields of law.66  This approach is not indifferent to ends.  The 
argument is, rather, that if the means are sensible, good ends will 
result.67  The aim is to uncover and foster the “institutional design” that 
is most likely to have this effect.68  In the eyes of these theorists, the 
larger narrative of the development of the bundle-of-rights view of 
property embeds three separate dangers, each of which gives rise to its 
own story critical of the bundle-of-rights conceptualization.69   
B. A Story of Ad Hocery 
The story: 
 
If property is not a thing, or a right to a thing, but rather a bundle of 
rights, immediately the question arises: what rights are in the bundle?  
The ad hocery story teaches that once the bundle-of-rights metaphor 
became entrenched, the bundle could consist of pretty much any 
agglomeration of the incidents enumerated by Honoré.  This is a story of 
 
 61. See, e.g., Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1725 (“Property law is a modular system.”); Smith, 
Institutions, supra note 5, at 2096 (“Property law manages much complexity through modularity.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1703 (“Boundaries carve up the world into 
semiautonomous components” that permit the management of highly complex interactions among 
private parties.). 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 1704 (“The right to exclude is part of how property works.”); Smith, 
Institutions, supra note 5, at 2115 (“exclusion is a starting point; it employs rough proxies that serve as a 
first cut at protecting a wide and indefinite set of uses”).  See also Lee Ann Fennell, Lumpy Property, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2012) (describing property’s “lumpiness”). 
 64. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1692 (arguing for “an architectural approach to property”); 
Smith, Institutions, supra note 5, at 2101 (“the architecture of property law in terms of exclusion and 
governance implements a modular structure that helps to manage the complexity of actors’ interactions 
with respect to resources”).  See also Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between 
Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 976 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, 
Gap] (“ends-focused theories tend to overlook the richness of the mechanism by which ends are 
achieved”) (emphasis added). 
 65. On the importance of in rem rights, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 852 (2001); Chang & Smith, supra note 16, at 
33–34. 
 66. See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 933–53 
(2010) (describing the importance of property’s exceptionalism to means-focused information theories). 
 67. Smith, Gap, supra note 64, at 970. 
 68. Id.  
 69. On the connection between narrative and stories, see Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law 
Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 147–48 (1997). 
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“nominalism,”70 in which property means nothing and becomes but “a 
‘laundry list’ of substantive rights with limitless permutations,”71 an 
“arbitrary assemblage with no inner coherence.”72  As one leading critic 
puts it, “different combinations of the bundle in different circumstances 
may all count as ‘property,’ and no particular right or set of rights in the 
bundle is determinative.”73  Property “could include all legal 
relations,”74 and “the bundle picture puts no particular constraints on the 
contents of bundles,” which are “totally malleable.”75 
Those who think of property in terms of means find the ad hocery of 
bundled rights troubling.  They argue that it occludes understanding of 
how property solves coordination problems.  First, it dangerously 
obscures the “in rem feature of property.”76  Viewed as a bundle, 
property is but “an elaborate catalogue of in personam rights” that can 
be configured by the state in any old way.77  This conceptualization 
denies property’s uniqueness as a legal category.78  Contracts, torts, and 
every area of law involve relations between and among persons; “if 
property [is] defined tautologically as a collection of legal relationships, 
then there [is] nothing to distinguish ‘property’ as a species within the 
genus of law.”79  More importantly, ad hocery misconceives a 
distinctive mechanism by which property operates, in the eyes of means 
theorists, to solve coordination problems in the real world: the use, in 
most cases, of standardized rights that send easy-to-understand 
messages to dutyholders to keep off what they do not own.80  “If 
 
 70. See Cohen, supra note 46, at 378; Merrill, Prism, supra note 14, at 248; Mossoff, supra note 
42, at 372.   
 71. Dagan, supra note 23, at 1534. 
 72. Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of 
Private Property, 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH 223, 225 (2011).  
 73. Penner, supra note 1, at 723. 
 74. Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 362. 
 75. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1697. 
 76. Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 82 (“the bundle of rights picture had a side effect . . . in 
that it obscured the in rem character of property rights”).  On the notion that property rights are 
ordinarily in rem exclusion rights, see, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 79 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Self-Help] (“because of positive transaction 
costs . . . we think in terms of things and especially in terms of in rem rights to exclude others from 
them”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360 (“property rights attach to persons insofar as they have a 
particular relationship to some thing and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large and 
indefinite class of persons (‘the world’) from the thing”). 
 77. Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 82.   
 78. See Baron, supra note 66. 
 79. Mossoff, supra note 23, at 2011.  See also Arnold, supra note 24, at 291 (“Property rights, if 
no longer defined by the things owned . . . , are not different than human rights, civil rights, contract 
rights, or the like.”).  Some ends-focused theorists have made the same point.  See Singer, supra note 8, 
at 1032 (“Taken to its extreme, the bundle-of-rights idea could suggest that property has no meaning 
whatsoever as a legal category . . . .”). 
 80. On the importance of standardization in property law, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
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property rights can be adjusted along countless margins, often in the 
course of the rendering of specific judgments by courts, then it becomes 
natural to start to think of property as a kind of master list of rights and 
duties set forth by some authoritative state institution for each type of 
property—or indeed, for each particular parcel of property.”81  But, 
means theorists assert, this kind of adjustment or customization is not 
characteristic of property.  Thus, in their eyes, the notion that rights can 
be bundled in limitless ways is dangerously misleading. 
Means-focused theorists also argue that ad hocery deprives property 
of any principled basis on which to decide disputes.  If all bundles are 
contingent collections of unrelated rights (or powers, privileges, and 
immunities, to use Hohfeld’s vocabulary), then what tells us how to 
evaluate any given bundle?  Should we just add up the number of rights, 
powers, etc., without evaluating how these components connect to 
normative goals?82  Should we privilege one stick in the bundle as 
essential, and if so, how would we recognize that stick?83  How can we 
tell whether any given restriction on land use, such as a total restraint on 
future alienation, is permissible?84  The bundle-of-rights metaphor 
makes all of these questions salient, but cannot itself answer them. 
A final reason that ad hocery is troubling to means-focused property 
scholars derives from the potential of the bundle-of-rights metaphor to 
make every interest its own property right, raising problems of over-
fragmentation and over-propertization.  This concern, it should be noted, 
is shared by others across the spectrum of property scholarship.85  The 
bundle-of-rights metaphor builds property out of component “sticks,” 
but each such stick can be conceptualized as its own independent 
property right.86  For Fifth Amendment purposes, for example, any 
asset—such as the development rights over Grand Central Station at 
 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 
1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization]. On the importance of in rem rights, 
see Merrill & Smith, supra note 65; Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 357–65. Not all property 
theorists share the view that property operates primarily in rem. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, 
Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 (2012). 
 81. Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 82. 
 82. See Dagan, supra note 23, at 1534, 1563 (suggesting that the bundles must be evaluated 
through a normative lens, and criticizing the dissent in U.S. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002), for failing to 
engage in a normative analysis). 
 83. Merrill, Prism, supra note 14. 
 84. Eric R. Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship, 8(3) ECON. J. 
WATCH 205, 211 (2011). 
 85. It has been the particular focus of Michael Heller. See infra note 91. See also MICHAEL 
HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008). 
 86. Penner, supra note 1, at 734 (describing how, under the “disaggregative” version of the 
bundle of rights, each use is “itself a property right if it can form the subject of a transaction”); Leif 
Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1923, 1928 (1997) 
(inferring from the Hohfeldian view that “each property right is property”). 
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issue in Penn Central87 or the right to mine subsurface minerals at issue 
in Keystone88—could be regarded as a separate property interest, such 
that a regulation substantially reducing or eliminating the value of this 
isolated asset would constitute a taking, regardless of the larger value of 
the property to which it is connected.89  The bundle-of-rights metaphor 
provides no way to determine the proper unit of analysis in takings 
cases.90  Moreover, the disaggregation of property bundles into smaller-
but-distinct property rights raises the spectre of multiple component 
rights owned by independent parties who cannot, or will not, agree to 
coordinate their interests.  In such cases, the fragmentation of the rights 
in the bundle into independent property rights leads to anticommons 
tragedies of underuse.91  As in so many contexts, the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor raises the question of how to understand the connection of the 
component rights to the whole bundle, but it cannot answer that 
question.92 
 
Another telling:  
 
The ad hocery story’s “moral” about property’s instability as a legal 
category, its futility in solving disputed issues, and its incoherence in 
defining actual property interests, depends almost entirely on the radical 
contingency of the bundling of particular rights, i.e., on the notion that 
the bundles are assembled willy-nilly and can be reassembled at will.  
But this vision of total contingency has been challenged from at least 
two directions. 
On one side, Merrill and Smith’s influential work on the numerus 
clausus undermines the ad hocery story’s picture of almost complete 
contingency.93  The numerus clausus principle posits that the universe of 
 
 87. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 88. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
 89. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 160; Alexander, supra note 10, at 801; Wenar, supra 
note 86, at 1928 (“if each stick is property, then removing a stick from someone’s bundle must be a 
taking regardless of what other sticks remain in the person’s bundle (if any)”).  This is the problem of 
“conceptual severance,” a term coined in Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: 
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674–79 (1998).   
 90. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated the problem, “because our test for regulatory taking 
requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the 
property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is 
to determine the denominator of the fraction.’” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 
U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
 91. Heller, supra note 45, at 670; Heller, supra note 20, at 1202–03.   
 92. This point is often made with other metaphors.  See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 29, at 632 (pizza 
metaphor); Mossoff, supra note 42, at 374 (shopping bag metaphor); Penner, supra note 1, at 754 (cake 
metaphor). 
 93. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 80. 
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property forms is closed and should remain so because of the high 
information costs that would be imposed if parties were free to create 
just any kind of property interest they might desire.  If property rights 
were infinitely adjustable in the way the ad hocery story proposes, then 
nonowners—dutyholders who must avoid violating others’ property 
rights—would have to acquire and process more information whenever 
they encountered a property taking a new form; “if in rem [property] 
rights were freely customizable—in the way in personam contract rights 
are—then the information–cost burden would quickly become 
intolerable.”94  As it turns out, in rem rights are not in fact customizable; 
the law limits owners’ ability to create new estates or ownership forms, 
i.e., “fancies.”95  Thus, property forms are “standardized” in order “to 
reduce the widespread information-gathering and processing costs 
imposed on third parties.”96  It is important to note that the numerus 
clausus is not primarily a prescription about how property should be, but 
is largely a description of how property is, “a fact about the way in 
which the system of property operates.”97  In other words, the ad hocery 
story notwithstanding, property bundles have not, in actuality, changed a 
great deal over time.98 
The story of the bundle’s radical contingency has been challenged 
from a very different perspective by the ends theorist Joseph Singer, 
who has claimed that a commitment to democratic values restricts 
owners’ freedom to do anything they want with respect to their property.  
“In a free and democratic society,” Singer writes, “some relationships 
are out of bounds; this means that some contract terms are off the 
table.”99  Singer understands the estates system not in terms of 
information costs, as Merrill and Smith do, but in terms of substantive 
values: “While the particular rules embodied in the estates system may 
be outmoded historical leftovers rather than embodiments of 
contemporary values, the idea of the estates system reflects a persisting 
norm that defines certain property arrangements as incompatible with 
our way of life.”100  Thus, property law bars owners from creating 
 
 94. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 387.  See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 90 (“If 
every property right was described by a customizable list of permitted uses . . . and these rights had to be 
understood and respected by all the world, the resulting information costs would be staggering.”). 
 95. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 80, at 27–34. 
 96. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 387.  See also Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, 
supra note 80, at 8 (on standardization of property as a means of reducing third party measurement costs 
that are true externalities to those creating unusual property rights). 
 97. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 80, at 24.   
 98. Id. at 23–24. 
 99. Singer, supra note 8, at 1048.  See also id. at 1049 (“Property law is part of the way we 
define a legitimate social order.  This means that certain property arrangements are defined as out of 
bounds.”). 
 100. Id. at 1049–50. 
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property rights that would enact “prohibited social and political 
relationships” such as feudalism or slavery.101  This is not only a 
normative claim about what property should do, but a descriptive claim 
about the way in which property operates in the present: “The estates 
system . . . outlaw[s] particular packages of legal rights with respect to 
property [in order to] shape social life in a manner consistent with the 
normative commitments of a democratic society composed of free and 
equal individuals who treat each other respectfully.”102   
Perhaps in theory the bundle of rights that constitute property could 
be changed in uncountable ways and at will.  But the relevant point here 
is that means and ends scholars agree that owners’ freedom to combine 
or recombine sticks in the property bundle is indeed limited.  Obviously, 
Merrill and Smith, on one side, and Singer, on the other, have very 
different understandings of the reasons why owners’ freedom to bundle 
property in an infinite number of ways must be limited.  That does not 
change the fact that, under either account, the bundles are not infinitely 
malleable.  The story of ad hocery is a story of possible, but not actual, 
danger. 
C. A Story of Elitism 
The story: 
 
Although the bundle-of-rights metaphor teaches that property is 
actually about relationships rather than things, nonlawyers often do 
think of property as things.  Thus, there is a gap between “ordinary” and 
“scientific” views of property103 or, to use a slightly different 
vocabulary, between “popular” and “sophisticated” views.104  Having 
two slightly different conceptions of property is not necessarily 
problematic,105 but at some point the ordinary, popular conception of 
property came to be seen as “benighted”106 and deluded.  Only well-
trained professionals, specialists, truly understood property.107  The 
elitism story about the bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property is 
about the way in which the bundle-of-rights view is overtly dismissive 
 
 101. Id. at 1051. 
 102. Id. at 1051–52. 
 103. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1977). 
 104. MUNZER, supra note 22, at 16. 
 105. Id. at 17 (arguing that the two conceptualizations can coexist “provided that the context 
makes clear which conception is meant”). 
 106. Penner, supra note 1, at 733. 
 107. Jonathan Remy Nash argues that this depiction is inaccurate on numerous grounds, but 
nonetheless describes it as the “metanarrative” of property paradigms and thus accepts that it operates as 
an important story of the development of differing views about property.  Nash, supra note 58, at 694.   
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of the lay understanding of property-as-things.108 
Like the ad hocery story, the elitism story is troubling for a number of 
reasons.  For those who take the position that property is about things,109 
uses of things,110 or setting the agenda for the use of things,111 the 
elitism story is a tale of how a false vision of property’s operation can 
undermine or obfuscate the truth.112  Moreover, if property as things is 
indeed “the natural frame through which people view property,”113 then 
the gap between the “natural” and “learned” views of property will be a 
source of frustration on both sides.  Those untrained in the law will not 
understand how academic lawyers talk about property, while academics 
grow ever more impatient with lay conceptualizations that they regard as 
naïve.  In concrete contexts such as takings, this frustration is not trivial; 
it is unsettling when “influential academic legal approaches to the 
Takings Clause are far removed from any ordinary understanding of 
what is at issue in the Clause and the kinds of reasoning appropriately 
used in settling cases.”114  As one scholar argues, “there should 
be . . . good reason to begin interpretation by construing key terms as 
people commonly do.  For then citizens who are legal specialists, and 
citizens who are not, are more likely to have similar views of the 
fundamental laws under which they all, after all, must live.”115  To the 
extent that the bundle-of-rights metaphor has crowded out lay views, it 
erodes the possibility of consensus on fundamentals. 
 
Another telling: 
 
 
 108. The understanding of property-as-things is not identical to what has been called the “castle” 
view of ownership.  See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: 
Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006).  The latter 
emphasizes an owner’s freedom to do exactly as he pleases with owned property, while the former 
emphasizes whether things are essential or even important to our definition of property. 
 109. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 1, at 805 (“The essential feature distinguishing property is that it 
consists of a right to a thing which is only contingently connected to any particular person.”). 
 110. Claeys, supra note 84, at 208 (arguing that property is about the power to determine the uses 
of things). 
 111. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008) 
(agenda setting over things). 
 112. See Penner, supra note 1, at 714 (arguing that the bundle of rights metaphor is a “slogan” 
that “rhetorically assuages the unease that results from our knowing there are real problems which, if 
plainly articulated, would demand serious consideration”).  See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 
388 (arguing that “as long as property is regarded as simply a cluster of in personam rights” critical 
features of property such as “legal standardization of property forms, or the numerus clausus” will be 
obscured). 
 113. Nash, supra note 58, at 726–27 (presenting data supporting this assertion, but arguing that 
“framing can affect one’s view of property rights”). 
 114. Wenar, supra note 86, at 1934. 
 115. Id. at 1946. 
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Scholarly work studying the effects of “framing” on perceptions of 
ownership suggests that views of property rights are not nearly as fixed 
as the elitism story suggests and, therefore, that it is by no means 
inevitable that the ordinary, lay conceptualization and the sophisticated, 
scientific conceptualization will diverge.  This work argues that the lay, 
thing-centered, “discrete asset” paradigm and the “bundle” paradigm are 
both simply “frames through which one views and conceives of property 
rights.”116  But framing has an impact: “the precise way in which a 
problem or choice is presented—i.e., its frame—may affect the 
decisionmaker’s perception of the problem or choice, and ultimately the 
decisionmaker’s preference.”117  Thus, “it might be possible to reframe 
property rights and thus change people’s conception of what it means to 
own property.”118  
Empirical studies show that framing matters, and that, for example, 
“subjects who received surveys that presented property rights under the 
bundle paradigm were more accepting of [legal] interference [with the 
exercise of their ownership “rights”] than those whose surveys presented 
the rights under a discrete asset paradigm.”119  Additional studies 
confirmed that “the use of the bundle paradigm to frame property rights 
attenuates ownership perceptions and reactions to subsequent rights 
restrictions.”120  The studies appear to show that “framing alone—with 
no other substantive legal intervention—changes expectations regarding 
the strength of property rights and reactions to subsequent 
regulation.”121  Thus, what were seen as fixed “things” can come to be 
seen as more malleable “bundles.”  So even if the elitism story is correct 
in its assertion that the discrete asset, thing-focused, paradigm is more 
“natural,”122 those without legal training can still be “educated” to the 
bundle paradigm.123 
More importantly, if “property rights are subject to a paradigmatic 
framing effect,”124  then presumably the reverse is also true: allegedly-
sophisticated actors who are well-trained in the bundle paradigm can 
come to see property through a discrete asset, thing-centered, frame.  
 
 116. Nash, supra note 58, at 708. 
 117. Id. at 709. 
 118. Id. at 710. 
 119. Id. at 721. 
 120. Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 
470 (2010).  These studies might appear to confirm the worst suspicions of those who see the bundle-of-
rights metaphor as a means for the enhancement of state regulatory power, as is asserted by the political 
opportunism story, discussed infra text accompanying notes 126–130. 
 121. Nash & Stern, supra note 120, at 456. 
 122. Nash, supra note 58, at 723. 
 123. Id. at 723–24. 
 124. Id. at 723. 
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Indeed, the resurgence of thing-based theories of ownership at the 
highest academic reaches of property scholarship proves the point.  At 
least some of the elites within the academy hold firmly to the lay, thing-
based conception of property even though they were taught the bundle 
view in law school.  Thus, the story of lay vs. sophisticated, ordinary vs. 
scientific, understandings of property could be told quite differently.  
Perhaps it is a story of oscillation—of shifting and reshifting 
perceptions.  Or perhaps it is a story of the enduring power of both the 
“thing” and “bundle” views, neither of which can totally displace the 
other.  Perhaps it is a story of alternations in focus, where sometimes we 
“see” property as a whole and other times see it as the sum of parts.125  
All of these stories may be told just as plausibly as the story of elitist 
dismissal of ordinary citizens’ views.  And under almost all of these 
retellings, a view of increasing or consequential divergence between lay 
and academic views seems unfounded. 
D. A Story of Political Opportunism 
The story: 
 
The third story emerging out the bundle-of-rights’ intellectual history 
is a tale of political opportunism.  It is parasitic on the ad hocery story’s 
message that, under the bundle-of-rights conceptualization, no core of 
essential rights is necessary to the concept of property and that, 
therefore, the arrangement or composition of the sticks in any property 
bundle is almost completely contingent.  This contingency has 
implications for property’s stability: “if property is just a bundle of 
rights . . . then adding or subtracting sticks from the bundle is an 
expected feature of social life and no particular configuration of rights 
should be privileged against inevitable change.”126  In the story of 
political opportunism, the contingency of property rights bundles 
effectively forced courts to turn to public policy to decide property 
disputes: “By 1925, it was abundantly clear that the definition and 
application of the concept of property could not be done by logical 
deduction.  The courts avoided paralysis by deciding cases according to 
public policy.”127  Moreover, the story continues, Legal Realists could 
use the bundle-of-rights metaphor to justify a conscious program of 
“enlightened social engineering.”128  As one scholar argues, the work of 
 
 125. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 278–65 (1994). 
 126. Merrill, Prism, supra note 14, at 248. 
 127. Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 366. 
 128. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1697.  See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 82 (“The 
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the Legal Realists “was part and parcel of a broader political program 
that sought to direct the use, development, and disposal of land and 
chattels through regulatory rules crafted by experts staffing the newly 
created federal and state administrative agencies.”129  Putting this point 
another way, “the ‘bundle of rights’ formulation enables its adherents to 
avoid the implication that the regulatory state is a tide of wholesale 
incursions on ownership.”130 
The political opportunism story is not just a tale about New Deal 
legislation and its aftermath.  It is a story about how policy became 
essential in creating and applying property rules.  For means-focused 
property theorists, who are concerned about the information costs of 
delineating property rights, direct inquiry into the public policies 
implicated by property disputes is problematic.131  The idea that property 
bundles do or should “respond to policy concerns in a fairly direct 
fashion”132 ignores the transaction costs of a “relation by relation, party 
by party” construction of property rights.133  In the eyes of these 
theorists, “property is a shortcut over the ‘complete’ property system 
that would, in limitlessly tailored fashion, specify all the rights, duties, 
privileges, and so forth, holding between persons with respect to the 
most fine-grained uses of the most articulated attributes of resources.”134   
Means theorists assert that because we do not live in a zero-
transaction-cost world, property delineates rights by employing modular 
baselines, “lumpy packages of legal relations—legal things.”135  
Property then uses an in rem exclusion strategy in the ordinary case136 to 
achieve ends such as “stability, promotion of investment, autonomy, 
 
Legal Realists’ motivation for advancing the bundle of rights picture was political.  The Realists sought 
to ‘de-privilege’ property . . . [in order to] facilitate more extensive collective control over property, 
especially through programs of redistribution.”). 
 129. Mossoff, supra note 23, at 2018. 
 130. Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium, 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH 193, 195 (2011). 
 131. See Smith, Gap, supra note 64, at 970, and Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1716–19, both 
arguing against direct resort to ends rather than means in property theory. 
 132. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1697. 
 133. Id. at 1696. 
 134. Id. at 1693. 
 135. Id. at 1693. 
 136. In some cases, the “exclusion” strategy described here will not work: “spillovers and scale 
problems call for more specific rules to deal with problems like odors and lateral support, and to 
facilitate coordination (for example, covenants, common interest communities, and trusts).  These 
governance strategies focus more closely on narrower classes of use and sometimes make more specific 
reference to their purposes, and so they are more contextual.” Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1703.  On 
the exclusion and governance strategies more generally, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002) 
[hereinafter Smith, Exclusion]. 
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efficiency, [and] fairness.”137  But these ends cannot be pulled out one 
by one and used as the basis for decisions.  To the contrary, “[r]equiring 
that each piece of the system and each stick in the bundle transparently 
reflect or promote our purposes”138 is neither necessary nor wise 
because, in our system of property, values are served collectively, i.e., 
“results emerge from the system as a whole rather than its specific 
parts.”139  If this is indeed how property promotes social order, then the 
story of political opportunism, which requires overt resort to public 
policy to decide every dispute, is another troubling—and misleading—
tale. 
 
Another telling: 
 
Even on the libertarian side of the ideological spectrum within 
property theory, scholars disagree that the political opportunism story is 
troubling.  Recall that the bundle-of-rights metaphor fragments property 
into component sticks, each of which can be characterized as a separate 
property interest in its own right.140  For scholars opposed to “the top-
down view of property that treats all property as being granted by the 
state and therefore subject to whatever terms and conditions that state 
wishes to impose,”141 the bundle’s fragmentation could sometimes 
operate against the expansion of state power, in that interference with 
any incident of property could be deemed a taking.142  Indeed, for 
libertarians such as Richard Epstein, who note that “the protection of 
each incident in the standard bundle of rights from state regulation 
reduces state power,” it is the “unitary conception of property rights that 
is in fact vulnerable to creeping statism.”143  In this view, the bundle-of-
rights picture of property enhances individuals’ power against the state 
rather than reducing it, as other versions of the political opportunism 
story suggest. 
And not all property theorists are libertarians.  To the extent the 
political opportunism story is about the triumph of the regulatory state, it 
 
 137. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1693. 
 138. Id. at 1719. 
 139. Id. at 1717. 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 85–91. 
 141. Epstein, supra note 72, at 227–28. 
 142. Id. at 228.  Libertarians are not the only group to have perceived the problem of enhanced 
propertization posed by the bundle theory.  See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 145–52 (on 
propertization of everything); Heller, supra note 45, at 663 (on decomposition of property rights).  For 
the latter scholars, however, the enhanced propertization of fragmented bundles is seen as problematic 
because such propertization, if truly carried into the realm of takings, would prevent all change, 
HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 151, or might proliferate unproductive anticommons, Heller, supra note 45, 
at 670. 
 143. Epstein, supra note 72, at 233. 
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is entirely congenial to ends theorists.  These scholars are committed to 
the idea that property requires state regulation because, in their view, 
property rights are not self-enforcing and because, they assert, in the 
absence of state intervention to impose limits on the exercise of property 
rights, property owners would be vulnerable to depredations by 
thoughtless neighbors.144  In this view, the Realists’ emphasis on the role 
of “public” power in “private” property simply made explicit an aspect 
of property ownership that was always true, but which had been 
suppressed by the absolutist rhetoric of the nineteenth century.  In the 
eyes of many contemporary property theorists, property remains 
suffused by regulation; the common law estate system has been 
pervasively supplemented by statutes governing zoning, fair housing, 
mortgages, marital property, and nearly every other aspect of property 
ownership.145  For antilibertarians, this is our property system, and these 
regulations exist because we would not want a society without the kind 
of protections they provide.146 
To the extent that the political opportunism story is a story about the 
central role of social policy in property law, it is especially congenial to 
ends-focused contemporary property progressives,147 who have argued 
that property should directly serve values such as human flourishing,148 
virtue,149 or democracy.150  Direct conversations about public policies 
that currently do or eventually should guide property decisions are, in 
these theorists’ eyes, a very good thing indeed.151  To the extent that the 
bundle-of-rights conceptualization in fact forces open consideration of 
the public policies operative in property law,152 the story of political 
opportunism is a fairly happy one. 
 
 144. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 11, at 68 (“Property seems to require regulation.”).  For an 
extensive examination of this argument, see Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 208, 216–18 (2002). 
 145. Singer, supra note 8, at 1052–53. 
 146. Id. at 1051–52. 
 147. I use their own descriptive term. See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).  In addition to Alexander, the Statement is signed by 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer, and Laura S. Underkuffler.  For an argument that these 
scholars are not progressive enough because they do not sufficiently focus on issues of acquisition and 
distribution, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 107 (2013). 
 148. Alexander, supra note 10. 
 149. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009). 
 150. Singer, supra note 8. 
 151. For a detailed development of this point with examples, see Baron, supra note 66, at 945–52, 
964–66. 
 152. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 23, at 1533 (“If property is a bundle, it means that it has no 
canonical composition, that a reference to the concept of property is an invitation to a normative inquiry 
rather than to a menu of inevitable packages of incidents.”).  Dagan warns, however, that sometimes 
courts seek to avoid the necessary normative inquiry.  See id. at 1534, 1561.   
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/2
2013] RESCUING THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS METAPHOR 79 
*   *  * 
From the larger narrative about the rising influence of the bundle-of-
rights metaphor for property, means-focused theorists crafted the ad 
hocery, elitism, and political opportunity stories.  These stories may not 
be false, but they are not entirely true either.  They are clearly meant to 
portray the bundle-of-rights conceptualization as analytically, socially, 
and politically dangerous, but it is by no means clear that the bundle-of-
rights metaphor functions in the negative ways the stories depict. 
III. THE CASE FOR THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS METAPHOR 
This Part argues that the bundle-of-rights metaphor for property can 
be helpful.  A bundle-of-rights analysis will help to specify the legal 
relations of parties in both simple and complex property arrangements, 
to identify explicitly the normative choices implicit in those 
arrangements, to assess the quality of the human relationships that 
property creates, and to force the production of information pertinent to 
those issues.  Bundle-of-rights analysis can address property’s means as 
well as its ends. 
A. Specification of Legal Relationships 
As we have seen,153 one thread within property scholars’ history of 
the bundle-of-rights metaphor attributes part of the metaphor’s rise in 
popularity to the de-physicalization of forms of wealth toward the end of 
the nineteenth century.  But of course property was divided between 
tangibles and intangibles much earlier.  Future interests, easements, 
profits, mortgages, and copyrights are all examples of intangibles that 
were recognized as property interests long before the start of the 
twentieth century.  Indeed, estates in land, the very bedrock of the feudal 
as well as modern property system for categorizing rights in realty, are 
not themselves tangible. 
One can speak of intangible property interests as if they were material 
objects.  Kenneth Vandevelde asserts, for example, that “the courts of 
Blackstone’s era claimed to be protecting the possession of things,” and 
“if no physical thing was possessed, as with incorporeal hereditaments 
or a chose in action, one was fictionalized.”154  But it is not just 
Blackstonian era courts who speak of intangibles as if they were objects 
capable of physical possession.  In common contemporary parlance, one 
“holds” a mortgage on Whiteacre, and one “has” an easement 
 
 153. See supra note 31. 
 154. Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 333. 
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appurtenant over Blackacre. 
But when we try to explain what is “held”—what a mortgage or an 
easement is—we quickly move to a different sort of terminology.  We 
talk about partial rights, rights involving other people.  An easement 
appurtenant is a right to pass over land owned by another155; a vested 
remainder is a present right to future possession of property currently 
possessed by another.156  Specifically, an easement holder may freely 
enter upon land he does not own where that entry would otherwise be a 
clear instance of trespass, while a remainderman may prevent the 
current occupant from making certain uses of the land (waste) that the 
latter would otherwise be free to undertake.  The easement holder, 
however, does not have unlimited freedom with respect to the servient 
estate, but has only limited use rights.  The same is true of the 
remainderman, who can control only a limited range of the current 
occupant’s behaviors. 
The bundle-of-rights metaphor is quite useful in these sorts of cases 
because it allows us to describe with great particularity and specificity 
who has what rights against whom.  In this way, the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor supplies a vocabulary that is “useful because it provides a 
language specifying what legal rights and obligations a particular 
property doctrine creates in terms of the precise obligations and 
parties.”157  This vocabulary is all the more helpful with respect to 
complex governance arrangements such as common interest 
communities or residential owners associations.158  The bundle-of-rights 
metaphor permits teasing out the different facets of ownership in these 
complex arrangements; in a condominium, for example, an owner might 
have one set of rights to his dwelling (a fee simple), but a different set of 
rights to his space in a parking lot (an easement) or to the common areas 
of the development, such as the swimming pool (joint tenancy).159  The 
owner might have one set of legal relationships with respect to those 
living within the condominium and a quite different set of relationships 
with respect to those who are not condominium members.160  Specifying 
 
 155. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 176 (3d ed. 2010) (“Rights to do specific acts on land 
owned by someone else are called easements.”). 
 156. Id. at 300 (explaining division of present and future interests).  For present purposes, I will 
use the term “right” to include Hohfeldian powers, privileges, and immunities. 
 157. Claeys, supra note 29, at 622. 
 158. Heller, supra note 20, at 1191 (asserting that the “thing-ownership metaphor . . . does not 
help identify boundaries of complex governance arrangements and modern intangible property”); id. at 
1193 (“the modern bundle-of-legal relations metaphor reflects well the possibility of complex relational 
fragmentation”).  Heller believes, however, that the metaphor gives a “weak sense of the ‘thingness’ of 
private property.” Id. 
 159. The particular example is drawn from ROSE, supra note 125, at 280. 
 160. Condominium declarations and by-laws, for example, may limit members’ rights among 
each other in ways that would not be true for fee owners.  See, e.g., O’Buck v. Cottonwood Village 
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each set of property interests, and the parties against whom they might 
apply, can sometimes be clarifying.161   
To be sure, understanding that property interests consist of specific 
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities that may vary depending on 
the parties involved (neighbors, trespassers, creditors, etc.) does not 
imply that an owner ought to have a specific power or ought to be able 
to fragment property interests in any particular fashion.162  Nor can the 
vocabulary alone tell us whether or how some rights ought to fit together 
into interconnected and interdependent groupings.163  But the fact that 
the vocabulary of bundled rights cannot itself answer these normative 
questions about the limits of fragmentation is not, alone, a critique of the 
metaphor.  If the bundle vocabulary enables clearer specification of the 
powers and interests involved in property fragmentation, or of the 
interests that could or should be grouped together, then at the very least 
it sharpens the framing of the normative issues that will have to be 
resolved.  There is something to be said for clarifying the issues on the 
table. 
To the extent it provides greater specificity, the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor is quite consistent with means-focused property theory.  
Means scholars concede that many property rights do not actually 
operate as in rem rights governed by exclusion, but instead require 
“governance rules,” which “allow society to control resources in 
nonstandard ways that entail greater precision or complexity in 
delineating use rights than is possible using exclusion.”164  For these 
rights, which require more fine-tuning than the exclusion strategy 
permits, the bundle-of-rights metaphor should be particularly helpful in 
specifying precisely the rights and relationships that the fine-tuning 
governance strategy might entail.165   
 
Condo. Ass’n., Inc., 750 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1988). 
 161. See Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for 
Merrill and Smith, 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH 215, 217 (2011) (suggesting that a student confused by the 
fragmentation of ownership into particular privileges of use, or by temporal limitations on ownership, 
might find the notion that the owner has broken his property into separate sticks “clarifying”). 
 162. Claeys, supra note 29, at 622 (arguing that the bundle vocabulary “cannot do justificatory 
work”).  See also Heller, supra note 20, at 1193–94 (arguing that the bundle metaphor does not 
determine how “to distinguish things from fragments, bundles from rights, and private from nonprivate 
property”). 
 163. ROSE, supra note 125, at 280 (noting that the bundle metaphor “weakens the sense that 
groupings of property rights might be interconnected and interdependent”). See also Smith, Things, 
supra note 6, at 1700 (“[P]roperty law provides for actual bundles of rights (or legal relations) that 
exhibit features relating to their completeness not captured as the sum of their parts.”). 
 164. Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 797.  On the general distinction between exclusion and 
governance strategies, see Smith, Exclusion, supra note 136. 
 165. Since the question of where to draw the line between exclusion and governance is an 
“empirical question,” Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 965, 1024–25 (2004), there is no way to know whether governance is truly exceptional, but in 
25
Baron: Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
82 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
B. Flexibility and Choice 
The bundle-of-rights metaphor captures a fluid conception of property 
as something that must be created rather than something that is already 
fixed.  The Blackstonian conception of ownership as despotic dominion 
produced an apparently simple algorithm for deciding cases, one that 
seemed to make choice unnecessary.  “Under the old Blackstonian 
conception, the key questions in any legal dispute were, who is the 
owner and was that person’s ownership unlawfully injured in some 
way.”166  When the Blackstonian conception broke down, it became 
increasingly difficult to deduce consequences from anything in 
property’s “nature.”167  If property rights are not absolute, then they can 
be limited.  Exactly whether and how they are limited involves choices 
about what rights ownership entails.  Moreover, these choices can 
change over time. 
As a bundle of rights, “property is malleable and adaptable.  New 
rights in property can be conceived.  New sets of rights can be 
bundled.”168  As Hanoch Dagan puts it, “the bundle metaphor captures 
the truism that property is an artifact, a human creation that can be, and 
has been, modified in accordance with human needs and values.”169 
The choices that underlie limitations on, or modifications of, property 
rights, require normative analysis.  As Dagan explains, “the whole point 
of the bundle metaphor . . . is to trigger such an analysis.”170 
Rather than resorting to internal deductive reasoning, decision makers 
must ask whether it is justified that a certain category of people (i.e., 
owners) will enjoy a particular right, privilege, power, or immunity over a 
category of resources (land, chattels, copyrights, patents, and so on) as 
against another category of people (spouses, neighbors, strangers, 
community members, and so on).171 
The answers to these questions will be neither obvious nor 
uncontroversial, but asking what is in (or out) of the bundle—for 
example, whether an owner’s rights against a neighbor should be the 
 
Smith’s other work he makes it clear that property begins with exclusion.  See, e.g., Smith, Things, 
supra note 6, at 1705 (describing exclusion as a “first cut” at serving the purposes of property law).  For 
an argument that “exclusion property” is not the dominant mode of ownership today, see Alexander, 
supra note 80. 
 166. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 381. 
 167. Vandevelde, supra note 24, at 328–330 (describing the erosion of the Blackstonian 
conception over the 19th century and concluding that “[t]his century long evolution resulted in an 
inability of property concepts to settle controversies and to legitimate the results”). 
 168. Arnold, supra note 24, at 289 (emphasis omitted). 
 169. Dagan, supra note 23, at 1532. 
 170. Id. at 1534. 
 171. Id. at 1533. 
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same as the owner’s rights against a complete stranger—forces 
transparency about the decisions being made.172 
Consider the law of landlord/tenant.  At one time, the law subscribed 
to the following axioms: a landlord was legally obliged to offer a tenant 
only the bare right of possession rather than actual possession;173 the 
landlord had no duty to mitigate damages on the tenant’s default;174 the 
landlord could deny consent to assignment or sublease for any or no 
reason;175 and the landlord had no duty to maintain the premises.176  The 
landlord’s bundle of rights did not require the landlord, in making 
decisions about the property, to take the tenant’s interest into account.  
Today, virtually every one of these old legal axioms has been 
reversed.177  The landlord’s bundle of rights under contemporary law 
does require consideration of the tenant’s interests throughout the 
leasehold relationship.  Unpacking the parties’ specific rights, powers, 
duties, etc. before and after the landlord/tenant “revolution” enables 
clarity about the choices—and values—pertaining under both the old 
and new legal regimes.  That unpacking also demonstrates that 
normative choices about property can and do change.  There is no 
consensus on whether the new regime is superior to the old.178  
Nonetheless, the bundle-of-rights formulation fosters clarity about what 
the disagreement is about and encourages explicit debate about the 
substantive issues. 
Clear identification of the parties, rights, powers, privileges, 
immunities, and values involved in a property dispute puts the issues on 
the table.  As with the limits of fragmentation, the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor alone cannot resolve them.  It does not follow, however, that 
all resolutions will be equally acceptable, or that there will be no 
principled basis on which to make judgments about possible 
outcomes.179  For example, we might, as one theorist has suggested, 
 
 172. See id. (“If property is a bundle, it means that it has no canonical composition, that a 
reference to the concept of property is an invitation to a normative inquiry rather than to a menu of 
inevitable packages of incidents.”). 
 173. Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824 (Va. 1930) (describing and following this rule). 
 174. Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977) (describing this rule, but declining to follow it). 
 175. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (describing this rule, but declining 
to follow it). 
 176. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing this rule, but 
declining to follow it). 
 177. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 173–176. 
 178. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution 
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991) (examining the possibility that the implied 
warranty of habitability will make tenants worse off). 
 179. See Dagan, supra note 23, at 1534 (“[T]he bundle metaphor should not mislead us into 
thinking that property can be conceived of as a ‘laundry list’ of substantive rights with limitless 
permutations.”). 
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think of different property estates, such as the landlord/tenant 
relationship or the tenancy by the entirety, as “default frameworks of 
interpersonal interaction,”180 each promoting different values, some 
more atomistic and others more communitarian.181  Under this theory, 
we would evaluate the “sticks” in each estate’s bundle by reference to 
whether they consolidated expectations or expressed ideals appropriate 
to the estate in question.182  Alternatively, we might evaluate whether, in 
a given context, the precise organization of property rights, duties, and 
so forth “promote relations of domination and subordination” or, 
alternatively, whether they “promote reciprocity” in the process of social 
coordination.183  There may be real disagreement over what principle—
freedom, virtue, or efficiency—should be used to evaluate any 
configuration of property sticks,184 but the notion of malleability and 
flexibility implicit in the bundle concept does not mean that decisions 
will be unprincipled or random.  Decisions will not have the automatic, 
algorithmic quality of the Blackstonian conception, but this does not 
mean the decisions cannot be rational. 
Consideration of individual property sticks and their bundling need 
not undermine the possibility of in rem rights.  Means-focused theorists 
highlight the transaction costs of delineating property rights and note 
repeatedly that in the real world, in which such costs pertain, it is 
unrealistic to construct property rights one by one, individual by 
individual, parcel by parcel.185  But the bundle-of-rights metaphor does 
not require consideration of every possible combination of parties, 
rights, and objects in dyadic combination.  We can ask, using the 
bundle-of-rights metaphor, whether an individual ought to have a use 
right that is good “against all the world.”  If in fact most property rights 
are truly rights in rem, accompanied by a correlative duty of respect that 
“has an impersonality and generality that is qualitatively different” from 
 
 180. Id. at 1558. 
 181. Id. at 1560. 
 182. Id. at 1562.  Reasonable persons might disagree about the values that are appropriate or 
whether a given outcome in fact furthers those values.  Dagan does not explain how we know what “set 
of human values” connects with any given “property institution.” Id.  For present purposes, this problem 
is not critical; what is important is that under his theory property does not collapse into a list of 
substantively independent sticks. 
 183. Purdy, supra note 9, at 1244–45. 
 184. See Katz, supra note 59, at 237 (“Property theory cannot tell us very much about what our 
priorities should be, e.g., efficient markets, a healthy environment, stable communities, or individual 
freedom.”). 
 185. See Chang & Smith, supra note 16, at 4 (In a zero transaction cost world, “we could serve 
each individual’s interest in use vis-à-vis every other individual’s potential use interest by specifying the 
rights and duties . . . that hold pair-wise between all members of society with respect to the most 
articulated uses of the smallest fragments of things.  This is intractable in our world.”).  See also Smith, 
Things, supra note 6, at 1696–98 (making this same point). 
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other, non-property-based duties,186 then the specification of interests 
under the bundle-of-rights model should only make that clearer.187  The 
“negative duties of abstention”188 entailed by rights in rem—duties not 
to enter upon, take, or use property owned by another—can be 
elaborated under the bundle-of-rights model even if, as property-as-
things theorists assert, “these universal duties are broadcast to the world 
from [a] thing itself.”189   
Nor does the bundle-of-rights metaphor require us to start from 
scratch, ignoring the existing system of estates or other property 
doctrines that have developed over time.  At the end of the day, in 
response to hard questions, we may decide to modify some of our 
current rules—as we did in the context of landlord/tenant relationships.  
But that does not require us recklessly to abandon or modify or recreate 
our entire estates system.  If proposed modifications would unduly 
disrupt the standardization of the numerus clausus, this disruption would 
be an argument against change.  The bundle conceptualization does not 
require us to choose to change existing property rules.  Rather, it 
challenges us to acknowledge the choices property entails. 
C. Property Rights as Relations Among Persons 
The bundle-of-rights conceptualization directs attention toward the 
effects of property rights (powers/privileges/immunities) on other 
people, be they other owners or nonowners, and this attention enables 
assessment of whether the relationships property constructs are morally 
and socially acceptable.  As we have seen, there is consensus that the 
 
 186. Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 787. 
 187. Some of the information theorists’ skepticism about the bundle of rights metaphor may 
derive from their view of what it means for a right to be in rem: “in rem property rights are qualitatively 
different” from in personam rights, they assert, “in that they attach to persons insofar as they have a 
certain relationship to some thing.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 364.  In addition, “in rem rights 
apply to a large and indefinite class of dutyholders.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 789.  Merrill & 
Smith argue that Hohfeld misconstrued in rem rights, seeing them as differing from in personam rights 
“only in the indefiniteness and the number of the persons who are bound by these relations.” Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 21, at 364.  
  If the bundle metaphor is incapable of dealing with rights that are good against indefinite 
numbers of persons, then it would follow that it is not appropriate for in rem rights, as Merrill & Smith 
define such rights.  But there is no reason to assume that the bundle metaphor cannot define rights that 
are, to use Merrill & Smith’s terms, impersonal and general.  Indeed, in recent work Merrill & Smith 
concede that “the bundle of rights picture is not logically incompatible with understanding that property 
rights are rights in rem.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 51, at 82.  It is true, as developed infra text 
accompanying notes 192–202, that the bundle often highlights the social, relational dimension of 
property rights, but the sociality described need not be constructed on a relationship-by-relationship 
basis or, as Smith puts it, “pairwise.”  Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1704. 
 188. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 359. 
 189. Id. 
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bundle-of-rights metaphor originates in Hohfeld’s analysis of 
fundamental jural relations.190  While Hohfeld’s primary justification for 
his scheme was “accurate thought and precise expression,”191 scholars 
have consistently noted that his pairings highlight the social dimension 
of property—that these relations pertain between people.192  Hohfeld 
was certainly aware of this dimension of his analysis, writing that “since 
the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, all 
jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be 
predicated of such human beings.”193 
Why should it matter that jural relations are “predicated of . . . human 
beings”?  Hohfeld did not directly pursue this question, but it seems 
clear that at a minimum it can be said that every exercise of a right, 
power, privilege, or immunity will affect another person.  An owner can, 
for example, keep his neighbor off his land and require her to obtain his 
permission if she wishes to enter.194  There is nothing inherently 
problematic or troubling about this social relationship in the abstract.  If 
the neighbor, for example, owned the parcel next door, she could keep 
the adjacent owner off her land and similarly require him to obtain her 
permission to enter.  Their relationship would be entirely reciprocal and 
balanced. 
Of course, not all persons are similarly situated with respect to 
property.  If the owner and the neighbor are not in roughly equal 
positions, in terms of ownership, and the neighbor is in need of 
 
 190. See supra notes 18–26 and accompanying text. In Hohfeld’s scheme, “claim rights” come 
paired with opposite “no-rights” as well as correlative “duties,” and similar pairings exist for 
“privileges” (duties/no-rights), “powers” (disabilities/liabilities), and “immunities” 
(liabilities/disabilities).  Fundamental Legal Conceptions II, supra note 18, at 710.   
 191. Id.  
 192. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 321 (“Hohfeld’s analysis illuminated the complex 
and relational character of ownership” and revealed that ownership is “fundamentally social.”); Cohen, 
supra note 46, at 363 (“[T]his institution of property that we are trying to understand may or may not 
involve physical objects, but always does involve relations between people.”); MUNZER, supra note 22, 
at 26 (“[T]he Hohfeld-Honoré analysis starts from the central truth that property involves relations 
among persons and with respect to things.”). 
 193. Fundamental Legal Conceptions II, supra note 18, at 721. 
 194. To use Hohfeld’s words, “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, 
the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty to X to stay off the place.” Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions I, supra note 18, at 32.  The legal relation between X as owner of a particular parcel and of 
Y as the nonowner of that parcel is also a social relation, in which X can exclude Y and Y is not free to 
enter X’s land without obtaining X’s permission. 
  I do not mean to suggest here that all property rights have exclusion at their core, though 
many scholars do believe that is true.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 38, at 12 (“[T]he essence of private 
property is always the right to exclude others.”); Cohen, supra note 46, at 371 (“Private 
property . . . must at least involve a right to exclude others from doing something.”); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (arguing that exclusion is 
central).  My point here is that property in Hohfeld’s example constructs a relationship between X and Y 
in which X has certain legal capacities—in this case, the capacity to exclude—that Y may lack. 
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something that the owner owns, then the social relationship property 
constructs involves a vulnerability of the neighbor to the owner.  This 
was Morris Cohen’s point about property and sovereignty:   
If . . . someone else wants to use the food, the house, the land, or the plow 
which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent.  To the extent that 
these things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers 
on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I want.195 
To recognize that property is a form of sovereignty, Cohen asserted, 
“is not itself an argument against it,” for “some form of government we 
must always have.”196  But not all forms of government—and not all 
legal relationships—are of equal value.  Cohen suggested that “it is 
necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of 
social ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to 
the discussion of any just form of government.”197 
We may find that many relationships exhibit rough equality, but we 
may find that many relationships do not.  The homeless, to take a vivid 
example, experience only duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities.  
This cumulation of the less desirable aspects of property consigns the 
homeless to a status in which it becomes possible for them to be seen as, 
effectively, objects rather than as subjects.198  In many important 
respects, property may connect to identity; lack of property may injure 
one’s sense of belonging or of citizenship.199  To the extent that deep 
disparities in status are troubling,200 we may find disturbing property 
relationships that construct serious, nonreciprocal vulnerabilities.   
The point is that focusing on the relational effects of property in turn 
forces consideration of the kind of relationships that, to recur to Cohen’s 
words, are acceptable to us as a matter of “social ethics and enlightened 
public policy.”  As with the specification aspect of the bundle-of-rights 
metaphor, there is nothing like consensus on what “enlightened social 
policy” requires or on what kinds of relationships it might condemn.  
Social obligation theory, to take one example, posits that “a property 
system should seek to nurture social relationships of equal respect and 
dignity, relationships of fairness and nondomination.”201  Even if 
scholars were in widespread agreement that property should further such 
 
 195. Cohen, supra note 38, at 12. 
 196. Id. at 14. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Jane B. Baron, Property and “No Property”, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1448 (2006). 
 199. See Nestor R. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the Housing 
Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 140 (2012). 
 200. Cf. Nestor R. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009) 
(discussing how status anxieties can fuel dysfunctionality in the acquisition and use of property). 
 201. Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1023–24 (2011). 
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relationships—and they are not202—“respect,” “dignity,” “fairness,” and 
“nondomination” are all qualities that can be defined in quite different 
ways.  The argument for the bundle-of-rights conceptualization of 
property is not that it will define these terms, but that it will force more 
open confrontation both of the kinds of relationships property ought to 
promote (or tolerate) and of the extent to which any particular 
relationship actually instantiates the qualities sought to be furthered. 
Means-focused theories argue that the bundle-of-rights 
conceptualization’s inquiries into the quality of property relationships 
potentially confuse means and ends.203  As recent work by Henry Smith 
puts it, the purposes of property are one thing (“our interest in using 
things”),204 but our “strategies” for serving those purposes (a baseline of 
exclusion, supplemented by governance)205 are different.206  A 
relationship-by-relationship analysis such as is promoted by the bundle-
of-rights idea ignores the ways in which property produces results 
indirectly, as a system.207  Smith asserts that the relational inquiries 
made as part of a bundle-of-rights analysis promote “the promiscuous 
employment of contextual information in property.”208  The answer to 
this objection depends on the word “promiscuous,” but if Smith’s 
concern about context is that its use denies that sometimes “results 
emerge from the system as a whole rather than its specific parts,”209 
there is no reason to fear the sort of particularized inquiry the bundle-of-
rights conceptualization contemplates.  A bundle-of-rights analysis is 
 
 202. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
889, 890 (2009) (“In its commonsensical understanding, after all, property consists of dominion—a 
domain of freedom to decide how to apply the object of ownership to his own life plans, independent of 
direction from philosopher-kings or anyone else.”); Penner, supra note 1, at 742 (“The right to property 
is the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or 
aided by others excluding themselves from it.”). 
 203. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1692 (“[T]o get anywhere, we have to be clear about the 
difference between means and ends in property.”).  See also Smith, Gap, supra note 64, at 963 
(describing a “gap” between property law and the end of human flourishing, but arguing that “[p]roperty 
is an area of law that has gappiness at its core”). 
 204. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1693. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (“Once we recognize the distinction between our interest in using things and the 
institutions that property law sets up to serve those interests, the role of property baselines as a means 
for achieving property’s ends becomes clearer.”). 
 207. Id. at 1717 (asserting “results emerge from the system as a whole rather than the sum of its 
specific parts”).  The concern is that the bundle inquiry will involve “all governance all the time.” Id. at 
1704.  While there is a rule for governance in means-focused theories of property, see supra notes 36, 
164–165 and accompanying text, it is a limited role, applicable only for “certain important potential use 
conflicts” such as nuisance.  Smith, Institutions, supra note 5, at 2096 (“Only in specific contexts does 
the law inquire into uses more directly, such as when one landowner produces odors that annoy a 
neighbor.”). 
 208. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1717. 
 209. Id.  
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capable of recognizing both that property rights can be disaggregated 
and that, disaggregation notwithstanding, property’s whole may 
sometimes be distinct from the sum of its parts.  Similarly, a bundle-of-
rights analysis is capable of assessing whether a particular exercise of a 
power that looks “nasty and selfish” is, in fact, “efficient, fair, just, or 
virtue promoting . . . in the context of the system as a whole,”210 and 
whether the system is serving some values collectively even if it is not 
doing so “individually and separably.”211  It is possible to accept that 
property operates as a system and yet examine the operation of that 
system in a granular manner, focusing on outcomes (the relationships 
the system produces) as well as architecture (how the system produces 
outcomes). 
D. Forcing Information 
The bundle-of-rights conceptualization of property is designed to 
elicit information.  Specifying who has what rights against whom, 
especially in complex property arrangements, requires examination of 
exactly how legal rights have been fragmented both physically and 
temporally and how they have been allocated among the parties.212  
Focusing on the system’s choices in granting rights, powers, privileges 
and so forth to some, while denying them (in whole or part) to others, 
requires clarity about the values, actual and ideal, served by property 
law.  Recognizing that property is social in character, that it affects that 
quality of interactions between situated individuals, invites 
consideration of what kinds of relationships we will accept or want to 
foster; equally, it invites consideration of what kinds of power 
individuals may acceptably exercise over other individuals. 
The bundle-of-rights metaphor has been criticized repeatedly for 
failing to provide a formula for answering these questions.  This 
criticism misses the point.  The metaphor’s function is to produce 
information that will make it possible to apprehend these questions, to 
make them salient.  Once we apprehend these—and appreciate that they 
are questions—we can discuss potential answers to them.  There is 
likely to be serious disagreement about the values property should 
promote—freedom, efficiency, equality, human flourishing, democracy, 
etc.—and about the particular rules to be used to further any one of these 
values.  It is true that the bundle-of-rights conceptualization cannot 
 
 210. Id. at 1718. 
 211. Id. at 1719. 
 212. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 161, at 216–17 (describing five dimensions in which rights in 
property can be fragmented); Heller, supra note 45, at 662–64 (describing ways of “decomposing” 
ownership rights). 
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resolve these disagreements.  But it can help make apparent exactly 
what the stakes are in the disputes, by providing a clear picture of the 
contexts in which they arise, the nature of disputes, and the concrete 
effects of exercises of property rights.  
Duties provide a helpful window on the information-forcing aspects 
of the bundle-of-rights conceptualization, especially by comparison to 
the information-hiding aspects of the theory of property as things.  
Summarizing very broadly, property as a law of things protects owners’ 
use rights through an exclusion strategy.213  That strategy, means 
theorists assert, solves a “massive coordination problem”214 created by 
the fact that “a large and indefinite class of dutyholders must know” 
what to do (or not do) in order “to avoid violating property rights.”215  In 
the eyes of means theorists, customized rights imposing particularized 
duties would pose an “intolerable” information–cost burden on 
nonowners.216  But, means theorists argue, “in rem rights offer 
standardized packages of negative duties of abstention that apply 
automatically to all persons . . . when they encounter resources that are 
marked in the conventional manner as being ‘owned.’”217  Thus, without 
knowledge of who owns property, for what purpose that owner intends 
to use it, or any other fact other than that they do not themselves own the 
thing in question, nonowners can fulfill their duties to owners by 
keeping off what is not theirs.218  And this makes individuals better off, 
as they will not unwittingly violate someone else’s idiosyncratically-
created right.219 
It is surely not surprising that the theory of property as a law of 
things, with its emphasis on the transaction costs of delineating property 
rights, highlights how much information is hidden by property’s 
 
 213. On the notion that property rights are ordinarily in rem exclusion rights, see, e.g., Smith, 
Self-Help, supra note 76, at 79 (“because of positive transaction costs . . . we think in terms of things 
and especially in terms of in rem rights to exclude others from them”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, 
at 360 (“[P]roperty rights attach to persons insofar as they have a particular relationship to some thing 
and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large and indefinite class of persons (‘the world’) 
from the thing.”). 
 214. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 387. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 794.  See also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2007) (“Property is a device for 
coordinating both personal and impersonal interactions over things.  Consequently, property rights must 
be communicated to a wide and disparate group of potential violators; these rights are in rem.  Because 
property rights need to coordinate the behavior of large numbers of unconnected people, they must be 
easily comprehended and must resist possible misinterpretation.”). 
 218. See infra note 222 (on the duty to “keep off”). 
 219. On the costs of idiosyncratically-created property rights, or “fancies,” see Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization, supra note 80, at 26–35. 
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modular architecture.220  Exclusion, for example, delegates to owners 
decisions about the use of their property, without anyone needing to 
know the purposes for which the owner intends to use the property.221  
Duty holders—those who must respect owners’ rights by keeping 
themselves off the latters’ property222—need not know anything about 
those owners or their intended uses.223  And since property acts in rem, 
the identity of duty holders also need not be known.224  In the theory of 
property as things, the impersonality of the rights and duties created by 
in rem exclusion rights is a positive: “Delineating the right based on the 
thing makes the right impersonal in the sense that contextual 
information about the owner and the duty bearers is generally not 
relevant to the nature of the right (duty).”225   
A far wider range of facts would generally be pertinent to a bundle-
of-rights inquiry.  The relationship of the owner to the dutyholder—
legal and factual—would be a starting point, for specifying the legal 
relations between parties is critical to a bundle-of-rights analysis.  From 
there, the analysis might move to the normative issue of whether the 
 
 220. Smith, Institutions, supra note 5, at 2096 (“the exclusion strategy allows the system of 
resource usage to manage complexity with modularity, with much information hidden in property 
modules”); Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1703 (Property “employs information-hiding and limited 
interfaces to manage complexity.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Smith, Self-Help, supra note 76, at 78 (the right to exclude all the world protects 
the owner’s interests in a wide range of uses without anyone needing to know anything about those 
uses); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728  (2004) [hereinafter 
Smith, Property Rules] (“The right to exclude . . . protects a reservoir of uses to the owner without 
officials needing to know what those might be.”); Chang & Smith, supra note 16, at 11 (“[t]he law of 
trespass studiously avoids making reference to particular uses”); id. at 32 (“the basic way that property 
is set up obviates the need to spell out uses”). 
 222. Smith, Property Rules, supra note 221, 1728 (“Property gives the right to exclude from a 
‘thing’ . . . . On the dutyholder side, the message is a simple one—to ‘keep out.’”); Smith, Things, supra 
note 6, at 1717 (“trespass and conversion send a simple message of ‘keep off’ and ‘don’t take’ (without 
permission)”). 
 223. Smith, Institutions, supra note 5, at 2096 (“from the dutyholder’s perspective, property is 
like a black box—a module—in that much information about uses and users is simply irrelevant to the 
dutyholder’s duty of abstention”); Smith, Self-Help, supra note 76, at 78 (dutyholders need not know 
anything about an owner’s intended uses or about the owner). 
 224. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 360 (property rights confer on owners “the right to 
exclude a large and indefinite class of other persons (‘the world’) from [a] thing.”). 
 225. Chang & Smith, supra note 16, at 33.  See also Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 787 
(“[T]he duty to respect the property of others . . . has an impersonality and generality that is qualitatively 
different from duties that derive from specific promises or relationships.”); Smith, Institutions, supra 
note 5, at 2100 (interactions mediated by a thing can be “relatively anonymous”). 
  Thus: 
[I]f a car is not mine, I do not need to know who owns it, whether it is subject to a security 
interest or lease, and so forth, in order to know not to take or damage it.  When A sells the car to 
B, many features of A and B are irrelevant to each other, and most are irrelevant to in rem duty 
holders, who only need to know not to steal the car.  Many details about A and B are irrelevant 
to their successors in interest. 
Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1703. 
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owner under the precise circumstances ought to be able to exert the 
exact exclusionary right in question—an analysis that might involve, to 
use earlier examples, an assessment of the quality of the interaction 
among the parties, the property institution in which the interaction was 
situated,226 and its capacity to promote reciprocity or domination.227  As 
a next step, the analysis could move to the effects of the owner’s 
assertion of exclusion rights on the nonowner and the kind of legal and 
social relationship exclusion constructs, examining (again using this 
Article’s earlier examples) whether the parties are symmetrically or 
asymmetrically vulnerable to one another228 or whether they stand in 
positions of equal (or unequal) respect and dignity.229  These questions 
beg for development of information as a basis for assessing the 
consequences of exercises of property rights and for making choices 
about whether those consequences are morally, socially, and politically 
acceptable. 
Means-focused property theorists argue that it is not “wise” to engage 
in “issue-by-issue balancing of values like community, autonomy, 
efficiency, personhood, labor, and distributive justice.”230  These may all 
be important values, but the bundle-of-rights picture “creates the 
expectation that the pieces of the system will serve these values 
individually and separably.”231  Means theories assert that, in contrast, 
the values are served “collectively,” and the “specialization of the parts” 
achieves “the goals of the whole.”232 
In the end, the means-focused objections to the bundle-of-rights 
analysis appear to focus on its potential inefficiency, the possibility that 
each and every case or dispute over property will require an intricate and 
elaborate inquiry involving multiple complex judgments of both fact and 
value.  For the moment, let us put to one side the question of whether 
bundle-of-rights analyses truly require the kind of extraordinary, time-
consuming effort this objection seems to posit; lawyers and legal 
scholars are fairly proficient at developing information quickly when 
needed.  The real question is whether a bundle-of-rights analysis will 
 
 226. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 230. Smith, Things, supra note 6, at 1719. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. See also Smith, Gap, supra note 64, at 970 (“It is fallacious to expect any given decision 
or rule or feature of the property system to partake of the desirable feature of the whole. . . . [P]roperty 
may promote human flourishing even if not every rule or decision on the part of courts or 
parties . . . directly (or best) promotes human flourishing.”).  See also id. at 974 (suggesting that 
property’s “infrastructure” promotes human flourishing “by making some decisions up front and across 
the board”). 
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constantly disrupt the ordinary operation of property, i.e., whether it will 
make every property case a hard case requiring specification, 
information forcing, and so forth. 
The framing of this question itself assumes that the ordinary operation 
of property is largely mechanical and uncomplicated.  But this 
assumption is questionable.  Many of property’s older crystalline rules 
have turned into standards; reasonableness tests are now ubiquitous in 
property law.233  Thus, the rules themselves may already effectively 
require exactly the sort of finely grained inquiries that bundle-of-rights 
analyses would involve.  As noted earlier, even those who argue that 
simple rules of exclusion lie at property’s core see a role for more 
complex governance strategies in some cases, and governance requires 
both “precision and complexity.”234  Whether governance cases are the 
exception or the rule is a matter of some debate,235 but the point is that at 
least some cases already involve much of the specification that the 
bundle-of-rights analysis entails.236   
Finally, even if most property cases, most of the time, were indeed 
simple and uncomplicated, it is also true that at times previously-
uncomplicated sets of rules—such as those involving landlord and 
tenant—come under stress.  A comprehensive theory of legal change is 
well beyond the scope of this Article, but one can predict at least some 
factors that force change.  When, for example, development puts 
pressure on once-plentiful resources, “anything-goes” approaches to 
land, reflected in rules emphasizing owners’ freedom, will work less 
well.  In such circumstances, the system is pushed to redefine owners’ 
rights.237  Ordinary rules of property work tolerably well in ordinary 
times; it is changed circumstances that require rethinking those rules.  
Because circumstances do not change constantly or dramatically, 
however, we are unlikely to want or need to rethink whole rule sets 
frequently. 
 
 233. Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 
(2013).   
 234. Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 797. 
 235. See supra note 165. 
 236. This point might be put another way.  It is surely true that from what might be called an 
“external” point of view—the view of dutyholders, for example—standardization minimizes costs.  
However, from what might be called an “internal” perspective, i.e., when we come to specify what each 
in rem package of rights consists of, we find there is considerable variation among the features of 
existing property rights.  Merrill and Smith have themselves explored some of that variation.  See 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 65, at 809–49.  See also Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2009) (arguing that not all property rights have exclusion at 
their core). 
 237. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence—
An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 591–92 (1990). 
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*   *  * 
Property constructs complicated legal and social relationships.  These 
relationships reflect difficult normative choices.  Analyzing property as 
a bundle of rights sharpens understanding of those relationships and 
those choices.  In addition, it produces information essential to 
evaluating their quality.  The granular inquiries encouraged by a bundle-
of-rights analysis need not preclude attention to structural or 
architectural features of the system.  Yet by the same token, 
consideration of the mechanics of the property system should not 
preclude consideration of whether, in fact, the bundles being produced 
are morally, socially, or politically acceptable.  These are all important 
questions.  The bundle-of-rights conceptualization can, and should, 
focus on both means and ends. 
IV. THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 
This Part examines two controversial information-based assets: 
electronic health records and commercial databases.  Whether these 
assets should be treated as property is the subject of broad debates.  
Although these assets are in one sense unusual, they may be typical of 
the kinds of goods that will raise property problems in the future, for 
they fit awkwardly into existing legal categories such as property, 
privacy, and intellectual property.  This Part argues that property rights 
in these assets, if they are property at all, will look more like bundled 
rights than like exclusionary powers over things.  Further, analyzing 
these goods through a bundle-of-rights lens will illuminate some of the 
hard choices these assets pose about who should obtain value from 
assets that are created by multiple actors. 
A. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) 
An EHR comprises “electronic documentation of providers’ notes, 
electronic viewing of laboratory and radiological results, e-prescribing, 
and an interoperable connection via a health information exchange with 
all other providers and hospitals in a community.”238  The information 
 
 238. Cong. Budget Off., Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Health Information 
Technology, Pub. No. 2976, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/91xx/doc9168/05-20-healthit.pdf. The Health Information Management 
Systems Society defines an EHR as follows: 
The Electronic Health Record (EHR) is a longitudinal electronic record of patient health 
information generated by one or more encounters in any care delivery setting.  Included in this 
information are patient demographics, progress notes, problems, medications, vital signs, past 
medical history, immunizations, laboratory data, and radiology reports. 
38
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/2
2013] RESCUING THE BUNDLE-OF-RIGHTS METAPHOR 95 
assembled in an EHR is of considerable value to medical service 
providers, who can use it to improve care, and to patients, who stand to 
benefit from those improvements.239  EHRs are also valuable to other 
entities, such as insurance companies, potential or actual employers of 
the patient in question, and marketing firms seeking to sell medical 
equipment or drugs.240  Unfortunately, the very same network effects 
that enhance EHRs’ utility to patients heighten the danger of 
unauthorized disclosure because more information could be released and 
distributed to more people.241  Although the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA)242 addresses some issues 
related to the security of the information in EHRs, it is widely agreed 
that the statute has many deficiencies that leave patient information 
vulnerable to unwanted disclosure.243  Thus, some scholars have 
suggested that, for purposes of control, patients should have a property 
right to the information in the EHRs pertaining to them.244 
Proposals for propertizing health information vary widely on a 
number of dimensions, from cloud-based records that would grant 
patients primary control245 to integrated networks created and accessed 
primarily by physicians and hospitals.246  Despite differences in these 
proposals’ detail, several common features appear.  One is a concern 
about the alienability of health information.  For ordinary property, such 
 
Electronic Health Record, Health Info. & Mgmt. Sys. Soc’y (2006), 
http://www.himss.org/ASP/topics_ehr.asp. 
 239. For a summary of the benefits of EHRs to the medical community and patients, see Jane B. 
Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 
374–75 (2012). 
 240. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the 
Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 334–35 (2007) (describing the 
range of entities that would find health information useful). 
 241. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic 
Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631 (2010) (describing network effects); Nicolas P. Terry, What’s 
Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 23 (2009) (describing the potential for 
abuse of patient data in modern longitudinal systems). 
 242. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 
42 U.S.C.). 
 243. For a summary of the arguments about HIPPA’s deficiencies, see Baron, supra note 239, at 
377. 
 244. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 241 (suggesting that patients be allowed to license rights to 
medical information for purposes of stimulating market development of EHRs); Edward J. Janger, 
Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003) (exploring 
costs and benefits of a possible regime of “muddy property rules” for personal information); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004) (proposing a five-
element model for propertized personal information). 
 245. Google proposed such a system, though it ultimately abandoned the project.  See Leena Rao, 
Google Shuts Down Medical Records and Health Data Platform, TECHCRUNCH (June 24, 2011), 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/24/google-shuts-down-medical-records-and-health-data-platform/. 
 246. For descriptions, see Hall, supra note 241. 
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as real estate or laptop computers, alienability is almost always seen as a 
plus, allowing resources to reach the persons who value them most 
highly.247  But the alienability of medical information is more 
problematic; patients may give or sell health information to an initial 
acquirer without understanding the many subsequent uses to which the 
initial buyer may put that information—uses of which the patient may 
disapprove.248  Desire to limit these risks has given rise to proposals to 
adjust the alienability of rights in health information.  Paul Schwartz, for 
example, has offered a “hybrid alienability” model of property rights in 
personal information that would “permit the transfer for an initial 
category of use in personal data, but only if the customer is granted an 
opportunity to block further transfer or use by unaffected entities.”249 
Proposals such as Schwartz’s contemplate a property right that would 
not accord to a single, identifiable owner a set of consolidated rights that 
grant near-absolute control, nor operate in rem, nor be highly 
standardized.250  EHRs involve multiple potential owners—reflecting 
inputs from patients, physicians, laboratories, insurance companies, and 
so forth.  The rights of these parties between and among each other are 
likely to vary; the patient’s right of access to information in the EHR 
may, for instance, differ from that of the patient’s insurance company.  
The bundle-of-rights metaphor seems suited to the complexity and 
asymmetry of the various parties’ interests in the information in EHRs.  
It captures the fact that ownership of information is divided.  It also 
helps show that the rights, powers, privileges, etc. of any one party with 
respect to another will not necessarily be the same as another’s with 
respect to that same other party.  
Analyzing property interests in EHRs as a bundle of rights facilitates 
the specification of who the different owners are, as well as variations in 
their powers with respect to health information.  That specification, in 
turn, will reveal differences and perhaps dispiriting imbalances.  
Revealing these imbalances enables consideration of whether patients 
have enough, or too much, power to control the information in their 
health records.  That judgment requires attention to how each party’s 
exercise of control affects others.  Perhaps, for example, physicians’ 
attempts to limit patients’ access to certain information in their charts—
information that doctors deem potentially dangerous to patients’ 
emotional or psychological well-being251—constructs a relationship of 
 
 247. See SINGER, supra note 155, at 278–80. 
 248. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1299–
1300 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2000). 
 249. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 2098. 
 250. See Baron, supra note 239, at 383. 
 251. Many states have statutes speaking to this issue. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-46-106; 
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paternalist power that bears rethinking. 
Bundle-of-rights analysis requires the development of a wide variety 
of facts about how the flow of information in EHRs affects the multiple 
parties to the medical record.  Those facts will not obviate the need to 
make judgments about which parties should exercise full or partial 
control over the record.  Instead, the revealed complexity of the divided 
interests in EHRs might suggest that such records should not be 
governed by a “property” frame at all.252  Perhaps “privacy” might better 
capture what is at stake.  But perhaps not.  The information produced by 
the bundle-of-rights analysis focuses attention on the many contributions 
that are required for an EHR to exist at all.  Once these different 
contributions become evident, legislatures or courts might decide that 
property rights are exactly the right way to reward different parties.  
Bundle-of-rights analysis can facilitate this decision. 
B. Commercial Databases 
Commercial entities routinely mine and collect the information 
available about individuals in cyberspace and assemble that information 
into databases.  That information, often collected secretly, is sold, inter 
alia, to advertisers who can use the information to more directly target 
messages to their customers or to other entities that can profit from the 
information.253  Because the information in databases can be quite 
sensitive, and because its disclosure can be quite harmful (think of 
negative credit scores), the ownership of the data in databases can be 
important.254  Because the effort to collect and compile information can 
be substantial and costly, the question of the ownership of the 
compilations themselves is also of notable interest.255 
As with EHRs, proposals for propertizing databases or of the 
information therein are problematic.  The United States Supreme Court 
has held that facts and compilations of facts lack originality and, 
 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18(2). 
 252. I do not mean to suggest that where a bundle analysis reveals complexity, property interests 
cannot be recognized.  The point is only that the granular analysis that the bundle conceptualization 
produces may lead to the identification of facts or values better encompassed by other areas of law. 
 253. Vivid accounts of the general process of data collection can be found in DANIEL SOLOVE, 
THE DIGITAL PERSON 13–26 (2004) and Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198–99 (1998). 
 254. See Schwartz, supra note 244, at 2057 (“[A] strong conception of personal data as a 
commodity is emerging in the United States, and individual Americans are already participating in the 
commodification of their personal data.”). 
 255. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 51 (1997) (tracing legal protections for noncopyrightable databases and examining alternative 
regimes to protect investors in information goods). 
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therefore, are not copyrightable.256  Since databases require no invention 
and are not business secrets, the other two major categories of 
intellectual property law—patents and trade secrets—also seem 
inapposite.  While the European Union has enacted a statute that 
comprehensively regulates databases,257 the US Congress has 
consistently declined to pass legislation that would protect databases as 
a new or sui generis form of intellectual property.258 
Without attempting full discussion of the law of databases, it is 
possible to identify some common features relevant to databases’ 
potential propertization.  For one thing, multiple parties contribute to the 
creation of a database asset.  Consider, for example, data aggregators 
who create detailed profiles of individuals by following individuals’ 
traffic on the Internet, use of ATMs, EZ Pass tolls, and the like.259  The 
individual being “dataveilled” produces the pieces of information of 
interest (mouse clicks, bank withdrawals, credit card purchases), but the 
data collector, who aggregates the data, produces a profile that pulls 
those pieces together.  It is the combined contributions of the individual 
and the aggregator that make the information a commodifiable asset, but 
the parties do not work in concert.  Indeed, as privacy advocates note, in 
many cases the individual is unaware that his or her information is being 
collected at all.260 
In this situation, we  could give to one or the other party the sole right 
to deal with the compiled information; such a right would look like the 
classic consolidated right to exclude.  Some scholars argue that the 
current legal regime already gives aggregators this power to exclusively 
control the commodity value of collected information.261  But it is 
possible to imagine a system that would recognize the independent 
contributions of the parties by giving both individuals and aggregators 
rights with respect to compilations of personal information.  In other 
words, we might give individuals some “sticks” in the property 
bundle—perhaps the right to be notified of data collection, the power to 
 
 256. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 257. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases, OJ L77/20, 27 March 1996. For a description of the Directive and 
comparisons to other regimes of legal protection, see ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
DATABASES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2008), and MARK J. DAVISON, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF 
DATABASES (2003). 
 258. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1139–40 
(2007). 
 259. See SOLOVE, supra note 253, at 13–26. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2000) (“Thus far, whether deliberately or by oversight, we have constructed data 
processing systems that do not involve the individual in decision-making about the uses of data 
collected by the system.”). 
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withhold information, or the right to be paid a fee for the use of that 
information—while giving other “sticks” to the data aggregator. 
The bundle-of-rights metaphor is helpful in this context precisely 
because it heightens attention to the possibility of divided, but shared, 
rights.  It invites specification of exactly how those rights should be 
shared, a question that will require a variety of judgments about, inter 
alia, the quality of the relationship between individuals and those who 
collect data about them, as well as the circumstances under, and the 
degree to which, it is appropriate to commodify personal information at 
all.262  Lifting the secrecy relating to data collection and forcing facts 
forward will help inform these judgments.  Perhaps when all the facts 
are in, the conclusion will be that it is not feasible to give individuals 
effective rights in the personal information collected about them.  If so, 
then they should not be given any property “sticks” at all and, as now, 
aggregators will retain exclusive control rights.  Bundle-of-rights 
analysis does not mandate that, in every instance, rights should be 
shared, only that the possibility of division and sharing be considered. 
*   *  * 
Neither of the assets examined in this Part necessarily qualifies as 
“property,” if what we mean by property is in rem exclusion rights 
consolidated in a single owner and good against the world.  The 
examples raise the question whether property rights necessarily have 
those qualities under all circumstances.  In both of the examined assets, 
it is possible to imagine giving individuals some, but not unlimited, 
powers over their health information and their data.  Bundle-of-rights 
analysis can help highlight these divisions and limitations and, in so 
doing, force more clarity about what it means to assign the label 
“property” to an asset or to the control of that asset. 
It is possible to imagine many other assets similar to the two 
examined here that also involve unconsolidated, divided, and shared 
rights.  One example involves the rights of celebrities to their 
“personae.”263  Another involves the rights of individuals to patented 
cell lines and other products derived from the individuals’ tissues, a 
problem famously discussed in Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California.264  The work of the bundle-of-rights analysis in these cases, 
in which multiple parties contribute to the creation of the asset, is to help 
us work out the limits of each party’s powers by specifying more clearly 
 
 262. On the commodification of personal information, see Baron, supra note 239, at 390–409. 
 263. On the right of publicity as a property right, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 12 (2d ed. 2011).   
 264. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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the variety of actors who might have or be affected by the powers in 
question, the relationships those powers might foster or construct, and 
the alternative possibilities available.  Where we are unsatisfied with our 
ability to construct workable limits, we may decide that a property frame 
is inappropriate.  Bundle-of-rights analysis does not commit us either to 
propertization or nonpropertization of these difficult-to-categorize 
assets.  It commits us only to clarity about the choices that must be 
made. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For a very long time, property has been conceptualized as a bundle of 
rights.  This Article argues that the current revolt against this 
conceptualization rests on contestable stories of the origin, development, 
and political valence of the idea that property is a bundle of rights.  
Thinking about property as a bundle of rights, this Article argues, can be 
helpful across a variety of dimensions: forcing specification of 
interconnected rights, powers, privileges, and liabilities; highlighting the 
choices implicit in any given configuration of property rights; focusing 
on the relationships property entails; and forcing factual information 
forward.   
Recognizing the utility of the bundle-of-rights conceptualization does 
not preclude thinking about property as a “law of things,” especially if 
“things” are defined broadly—to include intangibles, for example, as 
well as tangibles.  Sometimes it is helpful—and perhaps intuitive—to 
focus on the “thingness” of property.265  We experience property in 
terms of things in some instances.  But there are aspects of property 
ownership that the “thing” metaphor does not adequately describe: the 
way in which interests can be divided and shared, and the way in which 
property constructs relationships between persons.  The bundle-of-rights 
metaphor has been useful in capturing these aspects of property, and is 
likely to remain so, especially with respect to emerging forms of assets 
that are not easily assimilated into the model of single-person ownership 
protected by in rem exclusion rights.   
It is worth considering, especially in light of the development of these 
new asset forms, whether property will remain a viable legal category, 
whether it will “disintegrate,” as Grey suggested, or whether it will be 
swallowed up by the law of privacy or of intellectual property.  But the 
viability of property will not be determined by the metaphors in which 
we describe it.  We have nothing to fear—and much to gain—from the 
 
 265. Heller, supra note 20, at 1193.  See also Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, 
Concepts, and Visual Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005) (arguing that, although human 
relationships matter to the design of law, things matter also). 
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bundle-of-rights conceptualization. 
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